The Addiction Philosophy Map
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Descartes was onto something, l I am not indubitably   certain, in consciousness, that I exist and that I am   thinking such-and-such. But for so long as I am conscious,   consciously thinking such-and-such, I am   aware that I am so thinking. And that awareness - of   my experience and so of myself- defines consciousness.   Yet modern philosophy was soon beset with   puzzles about the self, self-awareness, and inner   awareness of experience.

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An internist's view," Dr. David Lewis says this idea has played a "paramount" role in classifying sifying diseases: "If the etiology and/or course of the disease appears to be primarily under the control of an individual, then it is thought to be a moral problem. If, on the other hand, the etiology and/or course of the condition is primarily beyond the control or intention of the individual, it is more acceptable to call that condition a disease."

 

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Individuals with addictive disorders suffer in the extreme with two basic aspects of human nature. They cannot control their emotions and they cannot control their behaviors. They either feel too much or they feel too little; they are over controlled or they are out of control. These two extremes are crucial if not essential aspects of addictive disorders. Such generalizations are a risky way to start a book. In doing so I run the risk of seeming to know the truth or of being dogmatic. 0

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Since we are interested in understanding human behavior, not merely in predicting it, we must next identify the determinants of intentions. According to the theory of reasoned action, a person's intention is a function oftwo basic determinants; one personal in nature and the other reflecting social influence. The personal factor is the individual's positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior; this factor is termed attitude toward the behavior. Note that the theory of reasoned action is concerned with attitudes toward behaviors and not with the more traditional attitudes toward objects, people, or institutions. The second determinant of intention is the person's perception of the social pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Since it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed subjective norm. Generally speaking, people intend to perform a behavior when they evaluate it positively and when they believe that important others think they should perform it. (Ajzen 1985, p. 12)

Ajzen, Icek. 1985. “From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior.” In Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior, edited by Julius Kuhl and Jürgen Beckmann, 11–39. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2.

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Since we are interested in understanding human behavior, not merely in predicting it, we must next identify the determinants of intentions. According to the theory of reasoned action, a person's intention is a function oftwo basic determinants; one personal in nature and the other reflecting social influence. The personal factor is the individual's positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior; this factor is termed attitude toward the behavior. Note that the theory of reasoned action is concerned with attitudes toward behaviors and not with the more traditional attitudes toward objects, people, or institutions. The second determinant of intention is the person's perception of the social pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Since it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed subjective norm. Generally speaking, people intend to perform a behavior when they evaluate it positively and when they believe that important others think they should perform it. (Ajzen 1985, p. 12)

Ajzen, Icek. 1985. “From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior.” In Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior, edited by Julius Kuhl and Jürgen Beckmann, 11–39. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2.