The Addiction Philosophy Map
02 December 2016
Rephrasing a problem in another sphere of human knowledge is an interesting thing. Especially it’s found when there’s a practical sphere of application. Translating data obtained from the speakers of common language to the terminology of a science is a widespread phenomenon. It’s a key element of sociology (interrogations, questionnaire surveys and then – the information processing) or medicine (anamnesis obtainment). In our case, an alcoholic visiting a psychiatrist with his / her has to undergo some interrogation to translate his /her everyday language to the strict terminology and not just relate about his / her relations with stiff drinks. It’s the terminology that allows doctors to analyze the same problems of alcoholism as a disease, predict its development, offer the possibility of treatment, etc. Speaking further about the problem of the translation of everyday language to the professional tongue does not make sense yet. There’re numerous standardization procedures, questionnaires, scales, etco
In normal subject, the first person perspective is an experience given to me as immediately mine.11 It is not belonging to me in the sense of a relation, neither implicit nor thematic, of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the sense of the self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation or self-awareness of experience is called ‘‘mineness’’ or ipseity (Henry, 1963). The changes in the patient’s introspective field testify to the serious problems in this domain: experiences are at a remove from the subject and do not seem to have their normal sense of mineness, although reflectively the patient acknowledges being the source of these interfering thoughts.
In normal subject, the first person perspective is an experience given to me as immediately mine.11 It is not belonging to me in the sense of a relation, neither implicit nor thematic, of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the sense of the self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation or self-awareness of experience is called ‘‘mineness’’ or ipseity (Henry, 1963). The changes in the patient’s introspective field testify to the serious problems in this domain: experiences are at a remove from the subject and do not seem to have their normal sense of mineness, although reflectively the patient acknowledges being the source of these interfering thoughts.