The Addiction Philosophy Map
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Such concepts can be drawn from some philosophically-minded psychologists and psychiatrists who explain the origin of schizophrenia with the minimal cogito concept. It shall be noted that the programming code of cogito can be accessed by external social experience together with multiple internal structure of the mind. Thus, in most cases, talking about the human self we mean we’re dealing with narrative cogito, that can be viewed as an independent phenomenon provided we use classical dialectic categories. On the one hand, it always contains a certain image of human experience

Another recent model draws together the concepts of alliesthe-sia and interoception to account for addiction (Paulus et al., 2009). Alliesthesia refers to the notion that whether or not a stimulus is rewarding or punishing depends on the internal (bodily) state of the individual (Cabanac, 1971). Negative alliesthesia is where repeated administration of a stimulus reduces its rewarding nature, for example the hedonic effects of drugs wearing off as the brain and body homeostatically adjust over time. Positive alliesthesia is where repeated administration (or omission) of a stimulus changes the internal mieliu in such a way as to increase its rewarding effects; this is the case of the subjective effects of smoking progressively turning positive in tobacco users. Alliesthesia is believed to have an important influence on the regulation of pleasure. We experience reward based on an evaluation of the stimulus relative to current internal state, and then engage regulatory mechanisms that maxi-mize the hedonic aspects of internal state (Cabanac, 2001). Key to this regulation is the comparison of the homeostatic state emerging from the body proper and some kind of central representation of desired internal state. Again, the insula is seen as the central hub of this interoceptive comparator mechanism

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DAMASIO, ANTONIO. 2003. “Feelings of Emotion and the Self.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1001 (1): 253–61. doi:10.1196/annals.1279.014.