In the fi rst philosophical step of his research, Ricoeur assumes the primacy in the
reality of the existing subject over the abstract Cogito, and the need to prevent the
“irrational” drift of philosophy. In the phenomenological method, he fi nds the key
to avoid this discursive weakness, to reconcile the transcendental dimension of
meaning with the immanent dimension of real existence. However, he cannot fi nd a
way to overcome the constitutive Cartesian dualism, because the opening of phenomenology
to the voluntary, that is the structures of practical Cogito, is not enough.
Phenomenology is a limit in itself: the concrete reality of the world, and the factual
and the objective dimensions of the subject cannot be fully considered.
Faced with corporeality, phenomenology cannot overcome the dualistic gap of
the body-subject/body-object, because, in remaining in the subjective dimension,
everything leads back to this dimension. It excludes the objective dimension of the
subject; in short, it is an abstract discourse that does not fully penetrate the concreteness
of the Cogito. However, phenomenology is the starting point for a philosophy
of the integral Cogito, because it immediately solves the contradictory and fragmentary
muddle of daily life by focusing on what is essential and constitutive. Thus,
following the phenomenological approach, I immediately experience my voluntary
dimension – and indirectly, by this, the involuntary. First of all, I understand myself
to be a wilful subject, as “I want”. This “I want” gives rise to the description of the
wanted. It is, in principle, “what I decide, the project”. “I decided this,
because
…”
constitutes the fi rst structure of the junction between the involuntary and the voluntary,
allowing me to relate many functions, such as need, pleasure, pain etc., to their
perspective, which is the “I” of the Cogito. The involuntary, which is considered
here, is connected to the sphere of the will as a “motivation” or “organ”; however,
“not all the involuntary is a motive or organ of the will”. There is something of the
inevitable at play, an involuntary that is absolute in relation to decision and effort
(Ricoeur 1966 , 8).
If the involuntary singles out the body, then the corporeal dimension deeply penetrates
the Cogito down to its basic structure: the wanted. When expressed through
the involuntary as need, pleasure, pain etc., corporeality approaches the decision.
The
Cogito
is deeply rooted in the
sum
. At this stage, the structure of the dualism
assumes a new formation. In it, the absolute involuntary stands as the terminus of
the original act of will (
Ibidem
), and thus it relates to the “Cogito as I”, as the alterity
of the Cogito.
(Busacchi 2016, 59–60)
References
Busacchi, Vinicio. 2016. “The Unconscious as a Principally Affective Matter.” In Habermas and Ricoeur’s Depth Hermeneutics: From Psychoanalysis to a Critical Human Science, 59–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9_5.
References
Busacchi, Vinicio. 2016. “The Unconscious as a Principally Affective Matter.” In Habermas and Ricoeur’s Depth Hermeneutics: From Psychoanalysis to a Critical Human Science, 59–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9_5.