The Addiction Philosophy Map
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Motivational Quotes

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The notion of a disorder of the self as being a core feature of schizophrenia has existed since the early days of schizophrenia research, but recent work has clarified and specified the type of self-disturbance that may be at play (Chung, 2007; Parnas, 2000; Parnas and Sass, 2001). In order to understand the type of selfdisturbance being referred to in recent phenomenological writings, it is necessary to distinguish between several ‘‘levels’’ or types of selfhood. Parnas (2003) identifies three levels of selfhood from a phenomenological perspective (see Table 1).

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'Qualia' is a philosophers' term of art denoting those intrinsic or monadic properties of our sensations discriminated in introspection. The quale of a sensation is typically contrasted with its causal, relational, or functional features, and herein lies a problem for functionalism. The quale of a given sensation - pain, say - is at best contingently connected with the causal or functional properties of that state; and yet common intuitions insist that said quale is an essential element of pain, on some views, the essential element. Functionalism, it is concluded, provides an inadequate account of our mental states.

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In normal subject, the first person perspective is an experience given to me as immediately mine.11 It is not belonging to me in the sense of a relation, neither implicit nor thematic, of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the sense of the self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation or self-awareness of experience is called ‘‘mineness’’ or ipseity (Henry, 1963). The changes in the patient’s introspective field testify to the serious problems in this domain: experiences are at a remove from the subject and do not seem to have their normal sense of mineness, although reflectively the patient acknowledges being the source of these interfering thoughts.
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In normal subject, the first person perspective is an experience given to me as immediately mine.11 It is not belonging to me in the sense of a relation, neither implicit nor thematic, of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the sense of the self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation or self-awareness of experience is called ‘‘mineness’’ or ipseity (Henry, 1963). The changes in the patient’s introspective field testify to the serious problems in this domain: experiences are at a remove from the subject and do not seem to have their normal sense of mineness, although reflectively the patient acknowledges being the source of these interfering thoughts.
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There is more to consciousness than the reflexive  character 'in this very experience ... ', or the apperception  therein of one's current experience. For part of  what makes an experience conscious - what brings it  to life-is its 'phenomenal' quality, 'quale'.  Qualia are traditionally defined as the 'raw feels' of  sensations, of experiences such as pains, tickles, dizziness,  etc. But this notion needs to be generalized. Not  only sensations, but all consciousness mental states  have qualia. 11  The phenomenal character, or quale, of an experience  is the subjective character of the experience, how  it 'appears' in consciousness: as we say, what it 'feels'  like, or simply what it is 'like', to have that type of experience.  Sensations have such qualities: compare  what it is like to taste a red Bordeaux wine, to taste  Haagen-Dazs chocolate ice cream, to smell the jasmine,  to smell the sea air, to feel dizzy, to feel  nauseous. (In these cases focus on the pure sensation  involved, for instance, the pure taste of the wine apart  from recognition of its varietal or vintage or region of  origin.)