The Addiction Philosophy Map
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The experience of the self as drunk

In this section we examine how Alison presents her engagement with alcohol as an experience of flux, oscillation and instability. We introduce the analysis with an extract which presents some of the main features of Alison’s engagement with alcohol. It also vividly illustrates how Alison turns to metaphors to describe her experience, a feature frequently repeated during the interview:

Some big wave, you know, you just get caught with it, that’s what it used to be like, this kind of like helpless feeling, just having to go and get drunk almost, you know, not even particularly wanting to, just feeling like there’s no other way when you are in that situation.

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Executive functions (EFs; also called executive control or cognitive control) refer to a family of top-down mental processes needed when you have to concentrate and pay attention, when going on automatic or relying on instinct or intuition would be ill-advised, insufficient, or impossible (Burgess & Simons 2005, Espy 2004, Miller&Cohen 2001).Using EFs is effortful; it is easier to continue doing what you have been doing than to change, it is easier to give into temptation than to resist it, and it is easier to go on “automatic pilot” than to considerwhat to do next.

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Within striatal circuits the neuromodulator dopamine is considered by many  to act as a learning signal, controlling neural plasticity (60). One of the main  lines of evidence has come from recordings of midbrain dopamine neurons  whose axons project to wide regions of forebrain (61)—including the striatum,  which has a very high density of dopamine receptors. In macaque monkeys such  cells often show brief (~0.1 s) increases in firing rate, particularly to unexpected  rewards, or to unexpected cues that signal upcoming rewards (reviewed in  62). The ability of dopamine cells to ignore fully expected rewards and shift  firing to cues that predict rewards has a strong resemblance to “error signals”  in certain formal learning theories (63) and certain computational models of  reinforcement learning”(64). Both classes of model refer to situations in which  the extent of associative learning is controlled by a simple signal that provides  feedback on the overall success or failure of an action or expectation. Because  the signal does not provide detailed information on the exact nature of any errors  committed, it is sometimes described as a “critic” rather than a “teacher” (65).

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In the first philosophical step of his research, Ricoeur assumes the primacy in the   reality of the existing subject over the abstract Cogito, and the need to prevent the   “irrational” drift of philosophy. In the phenomenological method, he fi nds the key   to avoid this discursive weakness, to reconcile the transcendental dimension of   meaning with the immanent dimension of real existence. However, he cannot fi nd a   way to overcome the constitutive Cartesian dualism, because the opening of phenomenology   to the voluntary, that is the structures of practical Cogito, is not enough.   Phenomenology is a limit in itself: the concrete reality of the world, and the factual   and the objective dimensions of the subject cannot be fully considered.
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There are different perspectives on the self, different possible definitions, and with each perspective and definition, naturally, comes a different explanation. Yet it is likely that something like an essence of self can be uncovered behind the multiplicity of views. In this article I suggest that a neurobiological account can help us find such an essence. The title of this article includes the words “feelings” and “self” because I believe the neural basis of feelings and of self have a shared neurobiological stem.