There is more to consciousness than the reflexive character 'in this very experience ... ', or the apperception therein of one's current experience. For part of what makes an experience conscious - what brings it to life-is its 'phenomenal' quality, 'quale'. Qualia are traditionally defined as the 'raw feels' of sensations, of experiences such as pains, tickles, dizziness, etc. But this notion needs to be generalized. Not only sensations, but all consciousness mental states have qualia. 11 The phenomenal character, or quale, of an experience is the subjective character of the experience, how it 'appears' in consciousness: as we say, what it 'feels' like, or simply what it is 'like', to have that type of experience. Sensations have such qualities: compare what it is like to taste a red Bordeaux wine, to taste Haagen-Dazs chocolate ice cream, to smell the jasmine, to smell the sea air, to feel dizzy, to feel nauseous. (In these cases focus on the pure sensation involved, for instance, the pure taste of the wine apart from recognition of its varietal or vintage or region of origin.) Perceptions too have qualia, phenomenal qualities more complex than those of pure sensations: compare what it is like to see a frog, to see a possum, or to hear a mosquito. Emotions too have qualia: compare what it is like to feel angry at a friend's remark, to feel anxious on a dark street comer, to grieve for a lost loved one. ('Feelings' do not reduce, however, to their qualia, or 'feels', nor are their qualia merely sensory qualia such as the 'feeling' in one's gut.) But moreover, even pure thoughts have qualia, so long as they are conscious thinkings: compare what it is like to think consciously, that President Reagan is obsessed with Nicaragua, to think that Fidel Castro is obsessed with Angola, or to think that the Dodgers are baseball's best. Every conscious mental state has a certain phenomenal quality, a quality distinctive of that type of experience. To have such a quality is part of what makes an experience conscious. Indeed, an unconscious mental state has no phenomenal quality: there is no such thing as its subjective or phenomenal character, what it is like to experience it, for the subject has no inner awareness of it as it transpires. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness might be compared to an electric light. When the light is on, in a given mental state, the state is conscious; when the light is off, the state is unconscious. Moreover, when the light of consciousness is on, the mental state has a specific phenomenal character, which consists in its structure 'appearing' phenomenally in consciousness. When the light is off, its structure does not 'appear'. (Smith 1986, 152)
References
Smith, David W. 1986. “The structure of (self-) consciousness.” Topoi 5 (2): 149–56. doi:10.1007/BF00139228.