There are different perspectives on the self, different possible definitions, and with each perspective and definition, naturally, comes a different explanation. Yet it is likely that something like an essence of self can be uncovered behind the multiplicity of views. In this article I suggest that a neurobiological account can help us find such an essence. The title of this article includes the words “feelings” and “self” because I believe the neural basis of feelings and of self have a shared neurobiological stem.
When we use the word self we think of something that bespeaks individuality. The word self often stands for an individual—a mind or a body, or both as a unity. In addition, we think of something that denotes stability and continuity over time, as well as singularity. In fact, singularity is so strongly associated with the notion of self that the finding of multiple selves is regarded as pathological. The notion of self is a synonym of personhood, and, connected to whatever meaning, self always implies a reference, for example, to an organism, to its behavior, or to its mind.
To speak of self is also, of necessity, to speak of consciousness. If I tell you that I have a headache, I must dig below the level of language and the referent pronoun “I” to the level of self in my consciousness. Ifl were not conscious of the headache, that is, if I did not have a mind, awareness, and a self, I would still have the headache, but I would not know it was me having the headache. The self is the key reference in the process of consciousness. The self endows us with a subjective perspective. The minimal level of self necessary for consciousness to occur is implemented as a mental representation. This does not mean, incidentally, that the self is some sort of mental homunculus. (DAMASIO 2003, 253–54)
References
DAMASIO, ANTONIO. 2003. “Feelings of Emotion and the Self.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1001 (1): 253–61. doi:10.1196/annals.1279.014.

