The Addiction Philosophy Map
<< < November 2016 > >>
Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
  1 2 3 4 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30        
Read more
Fleming, Robert (1937): The Treatment of Chronic Alcoholism. In N Engl J Med 217 (20), pp. 779–783. DOI: 10.1056/NEJM193711112172004

Each living being must interact with its environment  in order to survive. For living beings,  vital contact between organism and environment  must always be maintained—in the face of all the  risks of breaking away, in a manner of “continuous  discontinuity,” so to speak. We can call this  principle of sustaining contact the “Subject” of  life in the precise etymological sense of subjectum,  which designates what lies at the base of  all living behavior. In so far as the “Subject” can  be effective only as long as the organism continues  to live, it certainly belongs to this organism,  but it by no means resides inside of it.

If we take a pure philosophic approach to the problem of human control over the liquor amount he or she drinks, we come to an important issue of the free will. What’s more, the will is hereby understood as a part of moral self-perception. Something that helps human become a person. Certainly, any freedom is philosophically comparative. It’s limited by circumstances, for example. In this case, opinions clash with real life, an individual’s moral norms can contradict a public opinion, and sweet dreams face the harsh reality of their realization. The absolute freedom is always a dream. The social control is the prototype of the internal one, as a rule

Read more
Charland, Louis C. 2004. “A Madness for Identity: Psychiatric Labels, Consumer Autonomy, and the Perils of the Internet.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11 (4): 335–49. doi:10.1353/ppp.2005.0006.
But now, in inner awareness there is a more    complex form of self-awareness. Not only am I aware    of myself by virtue of the egocentric structure 'I...'.    But in inner awareness I am aware of my passing experience    by virtue of the reflexive structure 'in this    very experience [I see this frog]', and part of what I am    so aware of is myself, subject of the experience. Part of    my inner awareness of my experience, then, is an    inner awareness of myself by virtue of the structure 'in    this very experience I ...'.