In normal subject, the first person perspective is an experience given to me as immediately mine.11 It is not belonging to me in the sense of a relation, neither implicit nor thematic, of ownership, but rather as an identity of experience, as being me in an un-mediated way, without a gap or a fissure between the experience and the sense of the self. The first person perspective is a way or a form in which the experience manifests itself and is self-aware. This mode of self-articulation or self-awareness of experience is called ‘‘mineness’’ or ipseity (Henry, 1963). The changes in the patient’s introspective field testify to the serious problems in this domain: experiences are at a remove from the subject and do not seem to have their normal sense of mineness, although reflectively the patient acknowledges being the source of these interfering thoughts.0
Khantzian, E. J. 1985. “The self-medication hypothesis of addictive disorders: focus on heroin and cocaine dependence.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 142 (11): 1259–64. doi:10.1176/ajp.142.11.1259.

Действительно, склонность к перееданию может трактоваться как булимия, а стремление посадить себя на жесткую диету – анорексия. Однако как и в случае с алкогольной аддикцией мы можем говорить и о выраженных клинических формах, так и о многочисленных переходных состояниях. Более того, ее Величество реклама часто подталкивает нас расписаться в собственной слабости  в решении своих жизненных сложностей, сначала самим на себя навесить  ярлык медицинской или психологической проблемы, а затем искать внешней помощи. В статье Saddichha, Sahoo (2010): Disease Mongering in Psychiatry. Is It Fact or Fiction? In World Medical & Health Policy 2 (1), pp. 260–277 я нашел интересную пародию на подобное побуждение рекламой к медикализации  социальных проблем.

There is more to consciousness than the reflexive  character 'in this very experience ... ', or the apperception  therein of one's current experience. For part of  what makes an experience conscious - what brings it  to life-is its 'phenomenal' quality, 'quale'.  Qualia are traditionally defined as the 'raw feels' of  sensations, of experiences such as pains, tickles, dizziness,  etc. But this notion needs to be generalized. Not  only sensations, but all consciousness mental states  have qualia. 11  The phenomenal character, or quale, of an experience  is the subjective character of the experience, how  it 'appears' in consciousness: as we say, what it 'feels'  like, or simply what it is 'like', to have that type of experience.  Sensations have such qualities: compare  what it is like to taste a red Bordeaux wine, to taste  Haagen-Dazs chocolate ice cream, to smell the jasmine,  to smell the sea air, to feel dizzy, to feel  nauseous. (In these cases focus on the pure sensation  involved, for instance, the pure taste of the wine apart  from recognition of its varietal or vintage or region of  origin.)

Thompson, Hunter S. 1998. The rum diary: A novel. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.